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The Unequal Exchange of Time and Space:
Toward a Non-Normative Ecological Theory of Exploitation1
ALF HORNBORG2
Introduction
In this brief essay, I would like to address the
topic of unequal exchange—one that recurs in
Maurice Godelier’s work and is a cornerstone of
Marxian social theory. Many social scientists,
looking at the world around them, are intuitively
convinced that there is such a thing as ‘unequal
exchange’, but would admit to having a hard time
defining it. The problem of ‘unequal exchange’ is a
paradigmatically Marxian topic in that our difficulties
in conceptualizing it can be seen as part of the conditions
for its existence. Thus it cannot be understood other
than through an analytically demanding combination
of epistemological and ontological arguments that
require at different steps in the analysis the approaches
of both deconstruction and objectivism. This seems
to be the only way open to those of us who want to
pursue Godelier’s (1998) understanding of power as
based on consent; i.e., on the sharing of the same
representations among the powerful and the powerless alike, such that the powerless will often see
unequal exchanges as reciprocal. In this paper, I will
first try to show how and why mainstream economic
ideology must ignore the material substance of global
commodity flows in order to reproduce the image of
market forces as serving the interests of the many rather
than the few. I will then suggest some analytical tools
for deconstructing this image by identifying, beyond
1

and underneath the price tags, asymmetric flows of
material, productive potential (gauged in terms such
as energy, labor time and hectare yields). Finally, I
will briefly reflect on the implications of this line of
reasoning for contemporary discussions of the
epistemological ambitions of anthropology.
Exchange and the Value of Things
Few mainstream economists would recognize
the notion of ‘unequal exchange’ as an acceptable
and objective category of economics.3 The implicit
notions of ‘fairness’ that underlie economic reasoning
hinge on the subjective experience of the participants
in exchange, rather than in any objective analysis of
the substance of this exchange. As long as exchange
is conducted in terms of monetary exchange values,
and prices are understood to reflect the rational or
even benevolent logic of market forces, there is no
way—other than under conditions of monopoly—
that a market transaction can be classified as
‘unequal’. A million dollars’ worth of Swedish Volvos
exchanged on the market for a million dollars’ worth
of Venezuelan oil is by definition perfectly ‘equal’ in
terms of exchange value, which is the only gauge that
neoclassical economic theory is capable of applying.
It is simply beyond the horizons of neoclassical
economic analysis to ask, for instance, what the

A draft of this paper was presented at the 2002 Society for Economic Anthropology meeting in Toronto in a special session
with Maurice Godelier. Over the past thirty years, I owe much inspiration to Godelier’s continuing concern with
understanding power and social inequality and with unravelling the various mystifications through which power and
inequality are reproduced. I am indebted to Eric Jones for several editorial suggestions.
2
Human Ecology Division, Lund University, Sweden.
3
Economists nevertheless acknowledge problems of inequality deriving from conditions of imperfect information. The
economists’ solution is thus to try to create conditions for more perfect information flow. I would add that one very crucial
kind of information that seems universally to be “imperfect” is the physical properties of the traded products and thus their
capacity to contribute to the accumulation of infrastructure/capital (see below).
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difference between these two volumes of commodities
might be in terms of productive potential; i.e., in
terms of their physical contribution to the accumulation
of productive infrastructure, or capital. However
profoundly we manage to deconstruct the phenomenon
of money as a semiotic delusion—aptly classified
by Marx as a species of ‘fetishism’—the ideological
and practical hegemony of exchange value remains
more intact than ever. The foundations of Ricardo’s
science were devised by and for British bankers and
stock traders in the early 19th century (cf. Gudeman
1986), yet continue globally to pervade the lives and
thoughts of dominator and dominated alike. But as
the material and ecological inequalities of global
society are accentuated, we have every reason to
critically scrutinize the assumption that money and
exchange value are the measures of all that is significant for understanding processes of economic growth
and accumulation. Marxian theory has from the very
start struggled with the analytical problem of how
to effectively challenge the mainstream trust in
money and in the fairness of market logic. Marx
suggested that the market price of labor did not do
justice to its “real” value. He thus offered a normative
theory of value in the sense that it defined ‘value’
not in terms of the actual valuations of market
actors—as in the neoclassic notion of ‘utility’—but
in terms of an analytical construct (the labor theory
of value) that claimed to show how things ought to
be evaluated.4 Beyond the mystifying price tags on
labor that we know as wages, Marx thought that he
had found the objective foundation of value. In some
of his early work, Godelier experimented with
applying the Marxian labor theory of value so as to
identify unequal exchange between tribal groups in
New Guinea (Godelier 1969). Such unequal exchange
in labor time is not difficult to identify (cf.
Emmanuel 1972), but as a critique of neoclassical
economic theory it remains toothless as long as
invested labor is presented as (a) a measure of value,
and (b) as the only alternative gauge to warrant
consideration.
4

5

Although meant to serve a commendable
political purpose in Marx’s own time, this normative
approach to ‘value’ must be rejected as analytically
untenable. Marx realized that in order to challenge
the market ideology it would be necessary to
acknowledge some other gauge than exchange value,
but made the mistake of confusing this other gauge
with the notion of ‘value’. I believe that such
approaches represent a dead end street. I doubt that
it will ever be possible to convince economists or
market actors that scientists have a better knowledge
of the “real” value of things than the market actors
themselves. So, what does this other gauge—invested
labor—represent, if not value?
The answer may be easier to detect if we turn
to another kind of normative theory of value, namely
those theories that recognize, underneath the price
tags, not primarily labor but more generally energy.
This notion has a special heritage in ecological
anthropology following the early contributions of
Leslie White (1959), whose argument on energy
appropriation was in fact presented as an elaboration
of Marxist theory. There have been many proponents
of energy theories of value over the years, including
the so-called Technocrats in the 1930s and, over the
last few decades, the ecologist Howard T. Odum
(Odum 1988; Odum and Arding 1991; see also
Bunker 1985). Odum’s notion of eMergy (or ‘energy
memory’) echoes Marx in suggesting that the “real”
value of a commodity should be gauged in terms of
the amount of energy that has been invested in its
production. To Odum, value is added to raw materials
through the production process as increasing
amounts of energy are invested in it, and differences
in value between commodities reflect differences in
invested energy.
Now, what both ‘labor’ and ‘energy’ have in
common is that they are measures of productive
potential. They are literally the ‘productive forces’ of
any production process. But, contrary to Marx and
Odum, there is no specifiable relation between the
amount of productive potential that has been invested

I am well aware that Marxists would not agree with me that the labor theory of value is normative, but I maintain that a
theory claiming to be able to identify true sources and measures of value must be so classified. See next section for an
elaboration of this argument.
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in a commodity and the way it will be evaluated on
the market. Rather than reduce economics to
thermodynamics, then, our task should be to see how
the two are related. We have to keep them analytically
separate while showing how they are interfused in
actual social processes. In what follows I will try to
show that the relation between energy and value,
although of great significance, is better stated in terms
diametrically opposite to those of Odum.
A Non-N ormative Ecological Theor y of E xchange
Rather than say that we as social or natural
scientists have access to a more authentic measure of
‘value’ than the people who do the valuing, I think
we need to agree with the mainstream economists
that ‘value’ is defined by the cultural preferences of
consumers. This agrees well with anthropological
studies of the semiotics of consumption following
the work of Jean Baudrillard (1972) and Marshall
Sahlins (1976), who argued that value or ‘utility’ is
always symbolically constituted. Theories of value
should tell us something about the evaluations that
people actually make, not about how we as theorists think that they should value things. Normative
theories of value make the mistake of inserting themselves on the same logical level as the phenomena
they are to explain. To say that land, labor or energy is the ultimate gauge of value is itself a value
judgement.
How can we posit the occurrence of ‘unequal
exchange’ without recourse to a normative theory of
value? This can be done by analytically demonstrating
that there is, after all, in very general terms, a
systematic relation between the investment of
productive potential, on the one hand, and ‘utility’,
value, or price, on the other. But this relationship is
not usefully expressed, as Marx or Odum would have
it, so that investment of labor or energy somehow
translates into value. Rather, there is a kind of
inverse relation between productive potential and
price that follows with logical necessity from the
juxtaposition of the Second Law of Thermodynamics
and the social institution of market exchange. We
know that energy is not so much “invested” as it is
dissipated in a production process (Georgescu-Roegen
1971). Finished products must represent an increase
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in entropy compared to the resources from which
they were produced, yet they must be priced higher.
If we consider, longitudinally, the transformation of
a given set of natural resources into an industrial
product, Odum’s metaphysical measure of ‘energy
memory’ will correlate positively with ‘utility’ or price,
but objectively speaking, the amount of available
energy will be negatively correlated with price. As utility
or price increases, there will be less of the original,
available energy (or what Georgescu-Roegen and
others have referred to as ‘negative entropy’) left. This
means that industrial centers exporting high-utility
commodities will automatically gain access to ever
greater amounts of available energy from their
hinterlands. The more energy they have dissipated
today, the more “new” energy they will be able to
buy—and dissipate—tomorrow. Although most of
this transfer of available energy to industrial sectors
is dissipated in production, and a small share returned
to their hinterlands in the form of industrial products,
a significant part of it is indeed “invested” in an
expanding, industrial infrastructure in core areas of
the world system. A self-reinforcing logic involving
economies of scale in industry and the geographical
constraints of resource extraction (cf. Bunker 1985)
will continuously augment this process of accumulation and the unequal exchange of energy and
entropy on which it is founded. This, of course, is a
very different way of describing what economists
know as ‘growth’. An intensification of industrial
production will generally mean more competitive
prices, expanding market shares, and rising profits
for industrial sectors, which in turn means more
purchasing power with which to appropriate even
greater amounts of energy and other resources from
peripheral sectors. An intensification of natural
resource extraction, on the contrary, will ultimately
lead to local resource exhaustion and ecological
degradation, prompting investments to be shifted
elsewhere. Note that this account of unequal
exchange is not tantamount to an energy theory of
value, but rather the opposite. Like Marx and Odum
argued, it is necessary to refer to another gauge for
assessing market exchange than prices, but unlike
their work this account avoids the pitfall of parading
this alternative gauge as a better measure of value. In
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not offering an alternative theory of value, we not
only avoid having to systematically contradict the
evaluations that people actually make, we are also
free to suggest additional gauges of productive
potential that could be used alongside energy and
labor to illuminate processes of unequal exchange.
As I have previously argued, to observe that there is
an asymmetric exchange of those resources that are
crucial for the material accumulation of productive
infrastructure is not the same as saying that these
resources have a high value, a concept that should be
reserved for actual valuations by market participants.
The Unequal Exchange of Time and Space
I would like to suggest that one such alternative
gauge of productive potential might be expressed
as the unequal exchange of time and space. Both
labor time and natural space are sources of
available energy for industrial infrastructures, but I
am thinking here of ‘time’ and ‘space’ as human as well
as productive resources. Human time can be saved
as well as invested (as labor) in production, and the
same goes for space. When considered in relation to
the fundamental rationale of most modern technology, this means that time and space can be redistributed in global society through unequal exchange.
Most technology can be visualized as devices for
“saving” time or space: “saving” time by increasing
velocity (e.g., railways, cars, airplanes) and “saving”
space by intensifying the use of land (e.g., through
high-rise buildings or modern agricultural machinery). What we seldom take into account is that this
local “saving” of time and space is made possible
precisely by the expenditure or loss of time and space
elsewhere in the global system. Just to give an early
and fairly simple example, railways in the 1840s
may have saved time—and accessed more space—
for those who could afford to use them, but
obviously at the expense of the labor time of vast
armies of miners, loggers, steelworkers and railway
workers, as well as of the natural spaces where
clearcuts and strip mines were all that remained of
the landscapes that had to be sacrificed in the name
of technological progress. Again, this is not to propose that labor time or natural space could provide
us with a gauge of ‘value’, only to observe that there
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are alternative ways of gauging economic transactions that could provide us with objective measures of asymmetric flows.
The unequal exchange of time has to a large
extent already been exposed by Marxian theory,
notably in the work of Arghiri Emmanuel (1972),
who showed that low-wage countries have to export
greater volumes of products in exchange for a given
volume of imports from high-wage countries than
they would if the wage level were uniform. Yet I doubt
that the Marxists themselves have fully grasped the
implications of this analysis for our understanding
of the very nature of modern technology. If machines
from the very beginning of the Industrial Revolution
can be visualized as devices for saving time for some
at the expense of the time available to others, it would
not make sense to view the “development of the
productive forces” as a cornucopia promising to
emancipate the global proletariat.
If we add the more recent recognition that
there is also an unequal exchange of space—for example in the notion of ‘ecological footprints’
(Wackernagel and Rees 1996), such hopes of technological emancipation seem even more untenable.
The Industrial Revolution was not so much an
emancipation from natural constraints as the local accumulation of a capacity to export and redistribute such constraints in global society (cf.
Wilkinson 1973). What the ‘post-development’
world might teach us is that technological ‘progress’ or
‘growth’ may not be the cornucopia that Ricardo and
Marx believed, but local expressions of a global,
zero-sum-like game. And what this means in terms
of our understanding of concrete technology as a thoroughly social construct is even harder to digest,
because it means that a tangible piece of machinery like a tractor or railway engine would simply
not be feasible were it not for the uneven ways in
which human time and natural space are priced in
global society (Hornborg 2001). The contemporary, social condition of “time-space compression,” identified by the Marxian geographer David
Harvey (1990), relies on global processes of
time-space appropriation. The high-tech sectors of
global society presently celebrating their efficient use
of time and space appear largely oblivious of the
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extent to which this “efficiency” has been made possible by exploiting vast investments of human time
and natural space made, historically and presently,
elsewhere in the world system. Although such connections are generally concealed from their sight by
virtue of geography or the passing of time, “developed” sectors owe as much to slavery and ecological devastation as to genius and entrepreneurship.
Our fundamental conundrum, in struggling to
comprehend the mysteries of economic “growth,” is
that production is a material process that yields—
and hinges on—symbolic values. There is no mechanism
to link an item’s relative, material contribution to a
production process to its relative, symbolic value. The
various components of a production process are
reduced to a common, symbolic standard (money),
by which they are evaluated and exchanged vis-à-vis
each other, but there is no correspondence between
this evaluative scale and their relative, material
significance in the production process. The criterion
for such assessments must hinge on the occurrence
of accumulation of material and productive capacity
in certain sectors of society, indicating a history of
unequal exchange of productive potential. This permits
a buildup of productive infrastructure in certain
areas. Once such a perspective is adopted, of course,
we are faced with the question of how such historical
hindsight can be translated into an understanding
of present terms of trade that could provide a foundation for policies aiming at more equitable trade
relations. (This, however, is definitely beyond the
scope of this paper.)
Methodologically, the perspective on economic
growth outlined here could perhaps best be tested
by systematically translating a given set of exchanges
between two nations—say between England and one
of its colonies around 1800—into hours of labor and
hectare yields that were invested in traded commodities,
and those that were “saved” (i.e., substituted for) by
the buyers. Such analyses would probably become
more difficult and complex to carry out the closer in
time we get to our contemporary, more thoroughly
globalized economy.
One of the benefits of the suggested framework
is that it would help us to analytically distinguish
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between different kinds of “environmental problems”
in world system history. In view of the twin problems
of importing available energy (‘negative entropy’) and
exporting entropy, different historical and contemporary
cases of environmental crisis require different
analytical tools. There are cases, such as the Classic
Maya or Easter Island, where ecological overshoot is
not so much a consequence of long-distance resource
extraction as of locally generated overexploitation of
resources. There are clearly also a great number of cases,
such as Roman North Africa, British North America,
or the Sahel region of Africa, where environmental degradation was or is the result of the systematic
appropriation of local resources by distant centers. A
third type of environmental problem would be represented by 19th century London or 20th century
Moscow, where the accumulation of distantly derived resources is not sufficiently balanced by an
export of entropy (pollution, waste) generated in the
process. Finally, the recent North-to-South export of
the most polluting industries, as well as waste itself,
suggests a fourth version of ecological crisis, where
world system peripheries are converted into dumping
grounds for entropy generated by affluent core areas. With
reference to the final two versions, problems of “environmental justice” and “environmental load displacement” can thus be shown to have two distinct aspects,
since peripheral areas can be exploited both as sources
of ‘negative entropy’ and as sinks for entropy. I should
emphasize that I have been using the notion of
‘unequal exchange’ not in the moral sense of not getting one’s money’s worth, but in the naturalistic or
realist sense of an objectively asymmetric transfer of some
quantity or metric (other than money) by which the productive capacity of one social group is augmented
at the expense of that of another. My argument is
that industrial capitalism is founded and dependent
on such objective, net transfers of productive potential. It is thus not a moral argument at the level of analysis, but can of course inspire a moral argument when
articulated with the observation that an asymmetric
transfer (net import) of energy to one region or social group is the basis of a self-reinforcing accumulation of technological superiority and power visá-vis other regions or social groups.
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Can We Claim to Know More Than the
Economists?
There is a long-standing assumption in economics
that assertions of unequal exchange must imply an
underlying standard of value. My main point in this
paper, on the contrary, is that unequal exchange can
be conceptualized without recourse to the notion of
‘value’. To observe that there is an unequal exchange
of available energy between world system centers and
their hinterlands is no more of a value judgement
than to observe that such an unequal exchange is a
prerequisite to the survival of any living system. All
organisms, for instance, must appropriate more
available energy from their environments than they
can return to them. The difference between world
system centers and organisms, however, is that for
the former, the appropriation of available energy is
an asymmetric social exchange. Core areas of the
world system accumulate industrial infrastructure by
appropriating available energy and other material
resources from an increasingly impoverished periphery.
For an anthropologist to present such an alternative—and admittedly more pessimistic—account
of world trade and economic growth is more at odds
with the mainstream discourse of the discipline
today than it would have been thirty years ago, when
the legitimacy of pursuing an etic (objective)
perspective was generally taken for granted. How can
an anthropologist today claim to be offering “truths”
about human economies that are external and invisible
to the participants’ own representations of exchange?
Maurice Godelier is one of the comparatively few
anthropologists who continue to keep this door open.
In order for the consent of dominated groups to
exist, he says, the unequal relations “must, in one
way or other—by means of some mysterious process
that we must analyze—present themselves as a reciprocal
exchange of services” (Godelier 1994:105).
Godelier clearly wishes to retain the anthropological
prerogative to contradict the representations of the
participants. This is indeed crucial if anthropology
is to continue to deliver critical cultural analyses of
power. Godelier has used the example of the Inca
emperor’s relations to his subjects to show how an
exchange perceived by the most disempowered
participants as reciprocal—or even generous—can
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be objectively analyzed as unequal. Thus, we should
not be content with asking, as the economists do, if
people “get what they want.” Conventional
economic science is not at all equipped to deal
conceptually with the physical dimensions and
material logic of industrial accumulation. The
preferences of the transactors are not in any way
systematically geared to the material, accumulative
potential of traded goods and services. This applies
as much to the role of oil in industrial capitalism as
to the role of maize in the metabolism of the Inca
empire. Whether the illusion of reciprocity is
maintained by the institutionalized maize beer
parties of the Inca emperor or by Western notions of
‘market prices’, we must continue to have the ambition
to know more about exchange than the participants
in that exchange. In the modern world, this means
claiming to know something about exchange that
the economists don’t know.
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